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Do we lack it… 
or do we needed more than ever?
Undergraduate research by Marcin Iwankiewicz
Since the Enlightenment era, the field of Political Philosophy defined freedom in the Kantian framework
(universal, humanist, state-centred), which allows us to determine the extent of exercised freedom by individuals. However,
the omitted question is: what is the definition of freedom? My research aims to investigate the challenge proposed
by Max Stirner, 19th century German Anarchist, and Michel Foucault, 20th century French
Activist, to the Kantian freedom. Stirner and Foucault propose the need for self-disciplined individual, who
takes responsibility for their impact on themselves, others and the society they belong to; this becomes relevant in our
globalised, fast-moving world. In this research, the methodology undertaken is the examination of primary texts of Stirner
(The Ego and Its Own, 1844) and Foucault and the secondary literature. Whilst both thinkers think that we should be
more brave in expressing our individuality and will to live. Stirner points that we should remove
ourselves from all social ties, whereas Foucault sees impossibility to this end, we are more involved in
society than ever before by constantly creating and dismantling its structures.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
exercising freedom (a categorical imperative)
- when an individual uses reason and this is grounded:
• universality; • a rational outcome;
• the individual’s independent morality is governed
by a certain teleological outcome (Newman,2003).
Therefore, ‘free choice’ is to follow these moral
‘truths’. Hence, freedom and categorical
imperative are interdependent rather than
contentious notions (Kant,1963:59).
Enlightenment - we did not intellectually progressed, 
but…
Stirner: the moderns are no different to the ancients, they simply love the
development of rational, universal freedom throughout the history of
mankind (the Spirit). Therefore, the advocacy for spiritual freedom only
prolongs domination and alienation of individuals from her
concrete self.
Foucault agrees with Stirner: we need to reject Kantian universalism.
Unlike Stirner, Foucault sees Kant’s philosophy as embracing the critical
stance towards socio-historical context. This allows to see that,
“Illegitimate uses of reason are what give rise to dogmatism and
heteronomy” (Foucault,2000:308).
Talking about human nature is non-sense!
Both thinkers reject the philosophical enquiry regarding
nature of man, which observes human being as supreme
to the nature. For Stirner, moderns just improve the
ancients’ understanding of the world, from God to
supreme Humanity. This alienates the egoist and
judges her conduct in the society by her social duty.
Whereas, Foucault criticises Humanism for actively
contributing to a competition to ‘emancipate’ individuals to
become ‘true self’. Therefore, both thinkers accept that
politics of no-ideal-man will allow the individual
to self-constitute.
The state is more intrusive than ever before
Both thinkers see the state-as-institution as the
final enemy to the individual. In Stirner’s reading,
the liberal state reduces the individual to her
rights as well as interestingly the individual is self-
oppressing. This second discovery is important, because
the state depends on my support, without it the state will eventually collapse.
Foucault argues that the liberal state is less sophisticated than neoliberal state,
which reduces the individual to “entrepreneur of himself”, homo economicus
(Foucault,2008:226). Now the individual can express her economic freedom
even contra the neo-liberal regime. Like Stirner, Foucault finds that now
economic individuality is reduced only to my attributes.
‘I’ is not free by my morally good actions, as
Kant argued, instead ‘I’ is limited to ‘my’
definition of who I am. Therefore, Stirner
and Foucault develop theories which allow the
individual understands her freedom as self-
definition of and by the individual by
resisting against the given socio-historical
context, institutions, and ideologies.
Therefore, freedom requires self-discipline.
Like Kant, Stirner understands power as oppressive as
commonly understood in the 19th century, where the egoistic individual is
given choice to either be part of the system or being
excluded.
Unlike Kant, Stirner defends dialectic egoism by rejection of
all forms of the societal constraints, including moral codes. This
rejection is conscious rebellion against the state which has a monopoly
to how exercise our freedom and thought, what Foucault called
power/knowledge.
Whilst Foucault’s conception of power is positive defined as self-
constitution. Similar to Stirner, Foucault conceptualises power as
intertwined with knowledge and is held by the state
(power/knowledge) which underpins how it is implemented on the multi-
dimensional societal levels from prisons to schools and families.
Therefore, unlike Stirner, Foucault explicitly analysis power as
“not evil” (1997:298).
“What is freedom?
To have the will 
to be responsible for
one’s self.” Max Stirner, 1844
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Both thinkers:
What is power?
What the Enlightenment means?
What human nature or Humanism
means?
What is the role of the state?
These questions are not easy to answer, but I found
that the definition of power is most fundamental to
understand each thinkers’ radical notion freedom.
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